Kim Them Do
Abstract
This paper examines the evolving conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran as a critical test of the contemporary international legal order. It analyzes Germany’s constitutional, political, and strategic responses, highlighting the tension between legal obligations, alliance politics, and regional stability.
The study contrasts the positions of the CDU and SPD, situating their divergent interpretations of international law within Germany’s broader post‑war foreign‑policy tradition of military restraint and normative commitment.
The analysis shows that the escalating conflict, combined with domestic polarization in the United States and contradictory signals from Iran, has deepened uncertainty about the prospects for peace.
More broadly, the crisis illustrates the structural limits of international law in an emerging multipolar system, where legal norms are increasingly shaped by power asymmetries rather than universal principles.
The paper argues that restoring the effectiveness of international law requires adapting it to new geopolitical realities, strengthening multilateral mechanisms, and enabling the European Union to act as a strategic pole capable of linking normative values with operational capacity. Germany’s position exemplifies both the potential and constraints of Europe’s role in shaping a future rules‑based order.
Latest Developments in the Conflict
On February 28, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Washington’s objective was to end the theocratic regime in Iran and force the surrender of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He stated that, failing this, the United States would resort to military force and suspend all negotiation efforts related to Tehran’s nuclear program.
Shortly after the announcement, the United States coordinated with Israel to launch large-scale airstrikes against key Iranian facilities. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was reported to have been killed in these attacks.
These developments have raised widespread concern in international public opinion. Many argue that the post–World War II peace order is being shaken, and that international law is increasingly dominated by great powers. President Trump predicted that the conflict would end within four weeks, with a victory for the United States and Israel.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), if the fighting continues to escalate, a large-scale wave of refugees could spill over into neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, posing a serious risk of regional instability. At the same time, Israel’s deployment of ground forces into Lebanon has expanded the conflict and displaced large numbers of civilians.
Meanwhile, many Iranians—both inside the country and abroad—believe that the collapse of the current regime is imminent. However, ongoing violent repression has made the internal situation increasingly unstable and difficult to control.
Since February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel have justified their military actions based on the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This argument, however, has been met with strong criticism from many international law experts, who warn that an arbitrary interpretation of the right to self-defense could undermine the foundations of the contemporary international legal order.
Is International Law Losing Its Binding Force?
A key question arises: why, in the current context, are international law, European law, and even national legal systems increasingly ignored or selectively interpreted by major powers?
Current realities show that the world is operating within a power structure centered around three main actors—the United States, Russia, and China—each of which seeks to justify territorial ambitions, whether in Canada, Panama, Mexico, Greenland, Cuba, Ukraine, or Taiwan.
The explanation for this phenomenon does not lie merely in a decline of the rule of law or a “moral crisis” among states. Rather, the primary cause stems from profound changes in the global geopolitical balance. In addition to traditional superpowers, many emerging states—such as India, Turkey, Brazil, Iran, and South Africa—are increasingly asserting their ambitions to expand their influence and political standing in the international order.
In this context, international law is gradually losing its effectiveness as a binding mechanism for regulating relations between states. Instead, it is increasingly treated as an optional tool. The imbalance of power among major states has significantly weakened both the conditions for applying international legal norms and their practical validity.
The Balance of Power in International Political History and International Law
The history of international relations reveals a structural principle: when the balance of power among major states collapses, legal order is often replaced using force. In such circumstances, great powers tend to impose their interests on weaker states to advance strategic objectives, including territorial expansion.
This observation is not new. In East Asian history, the “tribute system” between China and Vietnam reflected a clear asymmetry of power. European history offers another instructive example. One of the earliest known diplomatic agreements—the Egyptian–Hittite Peace Treaty of 1259 BC, concluded between Ramesses II and Hattusili III—established a relatively durable peace. Its success stemmed from the fact that neither party possessed the capacity to impose absolute dominance over the other. In other words, it was the balance of power that enabled negotiation and stability.
This idea is also articulated by Thucydides in The History of the Peloponnesian War. In the “Melian Dialogue,” he suggests that justice can only be upheld when power is balanced; otherwise, “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”
A cornerstone of modern European international law is the Peace of Westphalia, which laid the foundation for a sovereign state system based on the principle of national self-determination within a framework of balanced power. Negotiations took place from 1644 in Münster and Osnabrück, involving numerous European powers seeking to end long-standing religious and territorial conflicts.
After 1945, the modern system of international law was further consolidated with the establishment of the United Nations. This system rested not only on legal norms but also on a specific power configuration: the bipolar order between the United States and the Soviet Union, maintained through nuclear deterrence during the Cold War.
The Transformation of the Current International Legal Order
Today, that order is undergoing profound change. China has emerged with ambitions to expand its global influence, particularly regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea. Meanwhile, the United States faces new challenges in maintaining global leadership, while Russia, India, Iran, and Turkey continue to expand their influence at both regional and international levels. Forums such as the G7, G20, and BRICS increasingly reflect the trend toward multipolarity.
In this environment, the weakening of international law is an almost inevitable consequence. Major powers increasingly treat legal norms as strategic instruments—something to negotiate, reinterpret, or even violate—rather than as universally binding rules.
Europe’s Role and Challenges in the New Strategic Landscape
Over the past two decades, the international community has confronted a series of systemic crises: the 2008 global financial crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis, the migration crisis, disruptions to global supply chains caused by COVID‑19, and the war in Ukraine. These shocks have deepened doubts about the effectiveness of collective action and the capacity of existing governance mechanisms.
At the same time, U.S. security guarantees to Europe have become increasingly uncertain. This raises a strategic question: where does Europe position itself within the shifting international order, and can it reduce its dependence on both the United States and China to become an autonomous power center?
One prominent argument is that, if international law is to be revitalized, Europe must reassert itself as a “normative power”—even a “legislative power”—on the global stage, echoing its historical role after the Peace of Westphalia. Achieving this, however, requires not only economic strength but also political cohesion and advancements in technological and military capabilities.
In the context of strategic competition between the United States and China, Europe has not yet established itself as a sufficiently strong third pole capable of shaping the global balance of power. The central question, therefore, is whether Europe can take the initiative in shaping the international order, or whether it will continue to allow its position to be defined by other powers.
This question is particularly urgent for France and Germany—the two pillars of the European project—and it plays a significant role in shaping Germany’s stance on the conflict in Iran.
Reactions in German Political Circles
In the German legal system, the principles of international law are directly embedded in the Basic Law (Constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany. Most notably, Article 26 prohibits the preparation or conduct of a war of aggression.
On this basis, German political actors and legal scholars have expressed a relatively clear position: Germany cannot participate in any military action that could be interpreted as an act of aggression under constitutional provisions. This is not only a binding legal requirement but also reflects a political tradition shaped by the experience of World War II—namely, deep caution regarding the use of force and a strong preference for peaceful solutions.
Accordingly, when assessing the attacks against Iran, Germany emphasizes the binding nature of international law and calls on all parties to strictly comply with international legal norms.
Differences Between CDU and SPD
CDU’s Perspective
Within the CDU, the overall stance is cautious but does not entirely dismiss the arguments put forward by the United States and Israel.
- Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul maintained that it was necessary to examine the “material issues of international law,” citing Iran’s ballistic missile program as a factor that could potentially justify military action.
- Prime Minister Friedrich Merz described the situation as a “dilemma of international law,” noting that existing legal mechanisms appear insufficient to address Iran’s nuclear program and domestic repression. He argued that it was “not the right time to put pressure on partners and allies.”
Overall, the CDU adopts a neutral position: it does not endorse the war, but it also does not categorically reject the legal arguments presented by Washington and Tel Aviv.
SPD’s Perspective
In contrast, the SPD has taken a clearer and more assertive stance on the legality of the use of force.
- The SPD emphasizes that international politics must be grounded in legal rules and norms.
- “Preventive attacks” are considered incompatible with international law.
- The party expressed support for the Iranian people and their aspirations for democracy, while warning of the dangers of military escalation.
- The SPD called on the government—particularly Prime Minister Friedrich Merz and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul—to adopt a “stronger voice” in defending international law.
Germany’s Official Position: A “Strategic Balance”
Germany’s overall stance is neither one of full support nor of direct confrontation with Washington. Instead, Berlin maintains a “strategic balance,” a hallmark of European foreign policy:
- Support for Israel’s security as a core national interest.
- Increased pressure on Iran regarding human rights and its nuclear program.
- Prioritization of diplomatic and negotiated solutions, in coordination with the European Union, France, and the United Kingdom.
- Avoidance of military escalation and refusal to endorse preemptive strikes.
In recent years, Berlin has increasingly viewed Iran as a regional destabilizing actor with a long record of repression. However, this does not translate into support for U.S. or Israeli military operations. Germany remains consistent in prioritizing international law and regional stability.
Germany’s Foreign Policy Tradition
Unlike the United States, Germany does not pursue a global military strategy and consistently exercises caution in the use of force. Instead, Berlin prioritizes non‑military instruments, including economic sanctions, diplomatic engagement, and support for civil society in Iran.
This approach is rooted in pragmatic considerations. As a NATO member, Germany is unlikely to openly confront Washington on strategic security issues. However, Germany’s refusal—along with France, Italy, and several EU states—to participate in military initiatives in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates a significant degree of caution in Berlin’s foreign policy.
Israel’s Security as a Core Interest
Due to the legacy of the Holocaust, Germany considers the protection of Israel’s security and survival a fundamental principle of its foreign policy. This commitment is not only political but also deeply moral and historical.
Concerns About Regional Instability
Iran is a large country of roughly 92 million people with a complex social structure. The collapse of the Iranian state could trigger severe consequences, including sectarian conflict, an energy crisis, and a new wave of refugees heading toward Europe. The memory of the 2015 migration crisis remains vivid in German society and continues to shape policy decisions.
Germany’s cautious approach also helps avoid accusations of pursuing “regime change,” a strategy associated with significant legal and political risks.
Between Values and Interests: A Balanced Approach
Germany’s position reflects a combination of normative values—such as support for human rights, democracy, and the Iranian people’s right to self‑determination—and concrete strategic interests, including regional stability, energy security, and the prevention of large‑scale conflict.
From this perspective, external military intervention often produces negative outcomes, whereas internal societal change in Iran is seen as a more sustainable path. Experiences from the 2003 Iraq War and the 2011 Libyan Civil War demonstrate that regime change by force does not guarantee stable state‑building; instead, such interventions frequently lead to power vacuums, prolonged conflict, and humanitarian crises. The ongoing consequences of the Syrian civil war further reinforce this perception in Berlin.
For Germany, instability in the Middle East is not an abstract concern but a tangible risk that could reemerge if the region descends into deeper crisis.
Thus, Germany’s position reflects both historical lessons and strategic calculations:
- Support for the Iranian people’s aspirations for freedom and democracy.
- Simultaneously, prioritization of regional stability, avoidance of military escalation, and rejection of regime change by force.
Updated Developments in the Situation
The situation continues to evolve rapidly, forcing Germany to adjust its position on an ongoing basis. President Frank‑Walter Steinmeier described the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran as “contrary to international law,” emphasizing that Berlin’s foreign policy would lose credibility if it avoided defining the legal nature of the conflict.
Meanwhile, the fighting has escalated further. Iran has launched large‑scale missile attacks on Israeli territory, prompting Israel to respond with airstrikes on multiple targets in Tehran.
In the United States, President Donald Trump warned that he would “consider all options” if the Strait of Hormuz was not kept open and secure, signaling his readiness to escalate militarily if necessary. He also openly criticized NATO after many allies declined to participate in securing the region.
At the same time, the No Kings protest movement has gained momentum across the United States, opposing the administration’s domestic and foreign policies, including the war with Iran. Large demonstrations in New York, Washington, and Los Angeles highlight deep societal divisions. Public support for President Trump has fallen to around 51%.
According to some sources, under mounting domestic and international pressure, President Trump may be considering a plan to end the conflict.
In his latest speech on the Nation, Trump claimed that America’s war objectives were “close to completion,” while also stating that the extremely heavy attacks on Iran would continue for “two to three weeks.” His assertion that Iran had requested a ceasefire was denied by the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and U.S. intelligence agencies remain skeptical of Tehran’s willingness to negotiate.
Iran, for its part, has threatened even harsher retaliation against both Israel and the United States. With contradictory and difficult‑to‑verify information circulating, public uncertainty about the prospects for a peace agreement continues to grow. The outlook remains highly uncertain, especially as Israel expands its military operations.
Overall, efforts to re‑establish peace remain fragile, and the future of the rules‑based regional and international order faces serious challenges.
Conclusion
The central question is whether the value and applicability of international law can be restored within the emerging multipolar order through a restructuring of international politics.
The conflict in Iran exposes the limits of the current international legal system and reflects the profound reconfiguration of global power relations. Debates over the right to self‑defense, the legality of the use of force, and the divergent responses of states suggest that international law can no longer function as a universal norm detached from political realities. Instead, it is increasingly shaped—and constrained—by power dynamics in a multipolar environment. This confirms the classic notion that the effectiveness of legal norms depends on a relative balance of power among their subjects.
In this context, the task is not to restore an outdated model of order but to reshape international law so that it aligns with the emerging multipolar structure. This requires acknowledging the conditional flexibility of international law, strengthening multilateral mechanisms to limit arbitrary interpretations of the use of force, and enabling the European Union to act as a strategic pole capable of combining normative commitments with real capacity for action. Germany’s position illustrates both the potential and the limitations of Europe: strong in norms yet still lacking the hard‑power foundation needed to defend them in a competitive strategic environment.
Ultimately, the future of international law will depend on the ability to reconcile legal norms with geopolitical realities. While a return to the idealized stability of the unipolar era is unlikely, international law can still retain its regulatory function if it is reconstructed as a framework that reflects strategic interests while preserving fundamental values. It is this delicate balance that will determine the prospects of a rules‑based international order in the twenty‑first century.
KIM THEM DO 