Kim Them Do
In the current political landscape of Vietnam, the concepts of „reactionary forces“ and „political opposition“ are often used with distinct connotations and roles. This article aims to compare the nature and content of these two concepts and propose an alternative approach, one that is hopefully more aligned with the evolving political reality shaped by the demands of social development and the imperative of sustainable national stability.
The Concept of „Reactionary Forces“
Theoretical Origins
The term „reactionary forces“ is not unique to Vietnam; it originated in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848). Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote: „All classes that have held a dominant role in history have at some point become reactionary classes – that is, classes that impede social progress.“
In the context of post-revolutionary France, Marxist theory categorized social classes that opposed the proletarian revolution – such as landlords, aristocrats and the bourgeoisie – as reactionary. These groups had interests closely tied to feudalism or capitalism. Additionally, so-called „pseudo-revolutionary“ or „reformist“ forces, such as the bourgeois democrats and the petty bourgeoisie, were also labeled reactionary because they sought limited reforms rather than the complete abolition of exploitative systems.
Interpretation and Application in Communist Countries
Depending on national circumstances, countries like the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam have developed their own interpretations of the concept:
Soviet Union: Lenin identified reactionary forces as any group obstructing the proletarian revolution – including former allies like the Mensheviks. Revolutionary violence and the dictatorship of the proletariat were seen as necessary tools to eliminate these forces.
China: Mao Zedong expanded the term to include all elements perceived as „against the people,“ the Communist Party, Mao Zedong Thought, or the socialist path. This ideological rigidity led to the categorization of various social groups – including landlords and intellectuals – as reactionary, often through public denunciation campaigns.
Vietnam: During the resistance against French colonialism, the term was used to describe those opposing the Viet Minh movement. Later, throughout and after the resistance against American involvement, reactionary came to refer to supporters of the Republic of Vietnam, overseas „anti-communist“ groups, or domestic minorities expressing dissatisfaction with the government.
The Role of Reactionary Forces in Contemporary Vietnam
Today, „reactionary forces“ continues to be used to describe individuals or organizations that oppose the policies of the Communist Party and the State. This includes those who disseminate material contradicting Marxism-Leninism or Ho Chi Minh Thought, incite unrest, persuade others to join opposition movements, or collaborate with foreign organizations deemed harmful to the government. Although the term lacks a precise legal definition, it is implicitly referenced in laws such as:
Article 109 of the 2015 Criminal Code (amended in 2017), concerning “Activities aimed at overthrowing the people’s administration.”
Article 331, which criminalizes “Abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the State, or the lawful rights and interests of organizations and individuals.”
Article 331 has sparked controversy for its vague terminology, particularly its failure to define what constitutes „abuse“ or „infringement.“ This vagueness allows for broad interpretation and potential abuse – especially against individuals expressing dissent, such as independent journalists and social media users.
Freedom of the press and the legal paradox
Article 25 of the 2013 Constitution guarantees citizens the rights to freedom of speech, the press, association, and demonstration.
However, in practice, these rights are not fully upheld. The reasons are included: There is no privately owned press in Vietnam; all media outlets are state-owned and operate under the direction of the Party. The press functions primarily as a tool of propaganda, directed by agencies such as the Central Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Information and Communications. Arrests, censorship, and criminal prosecution of independent journalists are no longer rare occurrences.
This leads to a legal and ethical paradox: when freedom of expression is not substantively available, accusing someone of „abusing“ a right that does not meaningfully exist becomes both legally problematic and morally untenable.
Two international metrics underscore this issue: Vietnam ranked 173rd out of 180 countries in the 2024 Global Press Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders). And Vietnam is the 7th highest jailer of journalists globally (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024).
Organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have repeatedly called on Vietnam to revise Article 331 to better align with international human rights standards. However, no significant reforms have yet been implemented.
The Concept of Political Opposition
Political opposition is a fundamental component of Western democratic systems. Political parties, organizations, and individuals are legally permitted to critique the policies of the incumbent government. In parliament, through the media, or in public discourse, they engage in debates over policy strengths and weaknesses and offer alternative solutions. Simultaneously, they serve as watchdogs, monitoring state power to prevent abuse. Crucially, opposition parties are free to campaign and, if they gain public support, can assume power through peaceful and legitimate elections.
Theoretical Origins
The practice of political opposition has evolved over centuries, with its intellectual roots tracing back to the Enlightenment (17th–18th centuries). In The Spirit of the Laws (1748), Montesquieu (1689–1755) introduced the principle of the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. This separation, he argued, was essential to prevent the abuse of power and to enable an effective role for the opposition in democratic governance.
John Locke (1632–1704), a major figure in The Liberalism, asserted that political authority stems from the will of the people. Therefore, when legitimate interests are violated, citizens have the right to protest. Locke championed freedom of speech and association – two essential conditions for the existence and legal operation of political opposition. His thought deeply influenced the U.S. Constitution and modern liberal democracies.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), through The Social Contract, also made a crucial contribution. While advocating for a model of direct democracy, Rousseau emphasized the importance of the general will and the acceptance of diverse opinions. For him, political opposition reflected the natural plurality of society – something that should not only be tolerated but also respected.
Interpretation and Application in Western Democracies
These theoretical foundations manifest differently across democratic systems:
In Britain, the concept of “loyal opposition” was formalized in the early 19th century. Non-governing parties are allowed – even expected – to criticize the government’s policies while remaining loyal to the core institutions of the state, such as the monarchy and the constitution. This principle was articulated by John Hobhouse in 1826 during a parliamentary debate.
The United States, operating under a presidential system, relies on a bipartisan model in which two major parties alternate power through competitive elections. Although the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention political opposition, the First Amendment—guaranteeing freedoms of speech, press, association, and petition – provides a robust foundation for its practice. The American model emphasizes institutional checks and balances and encourages compromise to resolve partisan conflicts.
In Germany, Article 21 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) governs the operation of political parties and explicitly protects the role of opposition as an integral part of democratic order. The Constitutional Court is responsible for safeguarding these rights.
In general, while many constitutions do not explicitly define „opposition,“ fundamental rights – such as freedom of speech, association, and electoral participation – guarantee its legal existence and effectiveness.
What About Vietnam?
Despite national reunification and decades of development, Vietnam has not adopted the democratic principles described above. Article 4 of the Constitution affirms the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) as the sole leading force of the State and society. As such, it does not recognize the legitimacy of a multi-party system or political opposition.
So, the key question arises: Should the CPV abandon the „reactionary“ label and recognize the role of a legitimate opposition? At present, the answer remains negative. The Party continues to maintain its political monopoly and shows no indication of revisiting the foundations of its authority. This stance stems from a lack of political will to re-evaluate its legitimacy and an unwillingness to adapt to changing social demands. But who has the potential to shift this mindset? There are two possibilities: A reform-minded minority within the Party itself and the broader public – especially those directly affected by policy outcomes.
What Is the Party Thinking and Doing?
After 50 years of reunification, the CPV’s political mindset remains largely conservative, with three observable tendencies: Equating dissent with subversion: Dissenting voices are frequently labeled as threats to national security, which stifles legitimate and constructive criticism. Wartime exclusionary mentality: The persistent „enemy or ally“ dichotomy creates a hostile environment for diverse opinions. Closed thinking: Criticism is seen not as a tool for improvement but as a challenge to Party authority and stability.
In today’s context – where political security is no longer under immediate threat – Vietnam has an opportunity to reclassify criticism: Constructive contributors should be seen as collaborators. Peaceful dissenters should be invited into dialogue. Calls for violence or hatred should still be handled by law, as in any rule-of-law state.
A shift in political language could bring tangible benefits. Moving away from the term „reactionary“ toward phrases such as “constructive criticism” or “divergent perspectives” could help depolarize debate. This would enable the state to cultivate more allies for reform and foster long-term political stability.
What Are the People Thinking and Doing?
Ordinary citizens, particularly those impacted by policy, increasingly feel politically voiceless due to the absence of press freedom and transparent mechanisms for feedback. This vacuum makes it difficult to detect errors or abuses of power and leads to widespread societal harm.
Social media has emerged as a vital channel for public expression – but it remains limited in producing structural change. If the public can develop greater political literacy, moderate critical thinking skills, and the ability to organize around demands for transparency and accountability, they will play a crucial role in transforming political thinking from the bottom up.
Young people, in particular need to understand civil rights, develop a constructive spirit of critique, and distinguish between extreme opposition and democratic debate. They must assert that opposition is not inherently destructive; rather, it is a stabilizing force. Accepting political opposition within the framework of the Party’s leadership could be an essential step toward building a truly law-governed state.
Lessons from Transitional Experiences in Asia
While Western democracies face growing polarization and populism, Asia’s transitional democracies offer valuable lessons:
Indonesia, once under Suharto’s military dictatorship, has transitioned to a multiparty system with a legitimate political opposition – without sacrificing stability or growth. Taiwan, once a one-party state under the Kuomintang, now has a vibrant democracy where opposition parties regularly contest and win elections. Singapore, although often described as a controlled or „formal“ democracy, still permits limited parliamentary opposition, which contributes to policy oversight and public accountability.
These examples demonstrate that democratization and political pluralism can coexist with national stability – if managed through careful institutional design and inclusive governance.
Conclusion
The distinction between “reactionary forces” and “political opposition” is not merely semantic, it reflects a deeper institutional and cultural choice. In a context where Vietnam is deeply integrated into the global economy and faces mounting pressure for comprehensive reform, a transparent, open, and serious dialogue about the role of opposition is essential – especially if the goal is to build a substantive rule-of-law state, genuine democracy, and long-term political stability.
The final questions remain: Is the Communist Party of Vietnam sincere and willing to rethink its governance model? Are the Vietnamese people informed, courageous, and committed enough to demand a more progressive future? These two conditions are prerequisites for meaningful change – though they cannot be fully answered within the scope of this article.
KIM THEM DO 