A conceptional study on the political philosophy of Hegel and Habermas
Kim Them Do
Vietnam in the New Context
In the history of the Vietnam War, under the banner of nationalism, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) led the struggle for independence, ultimately achieving national reunification in 1975. Fifty years later, the country is transitioning into a new era, yet the VCP continues to exercise a monopoly over determining the nation’s path. In this new context, Vietnam indeed faces many fresh opportunities. Over time, two primary arguments have emerged regarding the role of the VCP.
The first argument asserts that the VCP’s fifty years of heroic leadership demonstrate its capacity to resolve the country’s major challenges. Recent economic achievements are noteworthy: in 2024, the growth rate reached 7.09%, surpassing the target of 6.5–7%. Exports hit a record $405.53 billion, a 14.3% increase from 2023. Vietnam’s diplomatic standing continues to grow, exemplified by efforts to reconcile with the United States- once a wartime adversary – and by elevating bilateral relations to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership. With the latest agreement with Thailand, Vietnam now counts 13 countries as comprehensive strategic partners.
The pride in the Party’s glorious legacy fosters a spirit of national unity under its leadership. The Party, aware of its historic mission, can mobilize the population in the defense and development of a powerful and prosperous nation. In this framework, the Party exercises the right to national self-determination on behalf of the people without the need for a referendum. A key point of this argument is the affirmation of the Party’s “comprehensive and absolute” leadership as enshrined in Article 4 of the 1980, 1992, and 2013 Constitutions.
From this perspective, Vietnam’s military, economic, and diplomatic achievements serve as practical justifications for the VCP’s continued leadership, viewed as essential for ensuring a stable and prosperous future.
The second argument, however, contends that, in theory, the VCP can no longer invoke the concept of a proletarian socialist dictatorship. The slogan “patriotism today is love for socialism” holds true only within the confines of the Party’s ideological framework. In the context of today’s multidimensional political reality, it is no longer applicable. Patriotism can take many forms; citizens may love and serve their country without necessarily adhering to socialist ideology.
Fundamentally, the socialist-oriented market economy has produced a new exploitative class of crony capitalists, exacerbating social injustice. The VCP has been unable to control the inherent contradictions between market mechanisms and its proclaimed socialist orientation, and it has admitted that its socialist goals may not be realized until the end of the 21st century. The Party has also failed to present an alternative or updated theory that aligns with the country’s current realities.
In practice, several VCP policies have resulted in significant setbacks: entrenched corruption, environmental degradation, moral decline, an educational crisis, human rights violations, and growing social unrest. The Party’s monopoly on power has created a weak system of checks and balances, an ineffective judiciary, and a lack of transparency and accountability in public life. It has also failed to foster genuine reconciliation between the regions and among the Vietnamese people at home and abroad.
The VCP must recognize that interpretations of the nation’s heroic past should be open to re-examination. For example, the oft-cited claim that “the victory of April 30 was a victory of conscience and righteousness, ending suffering not only for the Vietnamese people but also for many American families” invites critical scrutiny. Whose conscience is being referenced? Was it a moral decision by the defeated, the resignation of the powerless, or merely the advantage of the victorious? As time passes, future generations will inevitably reassess the motivations and actions of all parties involved, striving for a more inclusive and balanced historical understanding.
Therefore, this argument concludes that – if Vietnam is to promote national identity and patriotism in a modern context – comprehensive political reform by the Party is more necessary than ever, emphasizing transparency and accountability.
These two debates are likely to persist. However, it is timely for both the VCP and the people to shift the conversation toward two essential new questions. First, should the Party reaffirm the concept of national spirit based on a legacy of exclusive leadership, or should it be redefined within the framework of a rule-of-law state and modern democracy? Second, should the legitimacy of the VCP and the principle of national self-determination be discussed as separate issues? Are the Party and the nation one and the same, or are they distinct entities? Who will be the true source of inspiration to drive Vietnam’s development in this new era?
Indeed, the concept of the national spirit may find deeper theoretical roots in Western philosophy than in Vietnam’s current political reality—Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy being a notable example.
Hegel’s View of the National Spirit
In the history of Western political philosophy, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 -1831) developed the concept of the national spirit (Volksgeist) in his work Phänomenologie des Geistes.
According to Hegel, the national spirit plays a crucial role in the formation and development of a nation. It represents a collective consciousness that encompasses values rooted in a nation’s cultural traditions, language, customs, laws, and historical experience. Each ethnic group has its own historical mission, and the national spirit serves as a motivational force to help the nation fulfill this mission. People who take pride in their national identity contribute to a sense of solidarity and assume responsibility for the progress of both their country and the broader human pursuit of freedom throughout history.
Broadly, Hegel’s concept involves two main points: First, the state is the highest expression of the national spirit, embodying the identity and moral values of a nation. Second, the national spirit is not a form of narrow nationalism but part of a universal process—the unfolding of the spirit of freedom—through which different nations contribute to the collective development of humanity.
The national spirit has been expressed through various revolutions around the world. Notable examples include:
- The American Revolution (1775–1783): Americans fought for independence from Britain under the slogan “No taxation without representation” and laid the foundations for a free and independent nation.
- The French Revolution (1789–1799): The French overthrew the monarchy and established a republic with the slogan “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” which became a symbol of the French national spirit.
- The Indian Independence Movement (1857–1947): Indians pursued independence from British colonial rule, largely through nonviolent resistance, eventually achieving sovereignty in 1947.
The Applicability of Hegel’s Thought in Vietnam
Is it necessary – and possible – to introduce Hegel’s thought on the national spirit to justify the role of the Party in Vietnam? If the Party can draw on the 2013 Constitution and integrate it with elements of Hegel’s philosophy, it might gain a more compelling ideological framework for reshaping Vietnam’s political identity.
The 2013 Constitution of Vietnam serves not only as a legal foundation but also reflects the development of the national spirit. For instance:
- Article 65: “Defending the Fatherland is a sacred duty and a noble right of citizens. Citizens must fulfill their military service and participate in building national defense for the people.”
- Article 70: “The State protects and promotes the fine traditional cultural values of the nation, absorbs the essence of human culture, and develops an advanced culture imbued with national identity.”
- Article 75: “The State shall ensure the right to freedom of belief and religion of citizens; protect legitimate religious institutions.”
Although the national spirit is stipulated in these constitutional provisions, their practical application remains questionable. The central issue is whether the Constitution truly holds supreme value. The answer, in practice, appears to be negative.
While theoretically the Constitution is the supreme law, in practice it institutionalizes and legitimizes the Party’s programs. It serves more as a legal instrument to solidify the Party’s comprehensive leadership than as an independent democratic framework. Thus, Vietnam does not possess a constitution that meets modern democratic standards, where the rule of law and people’s sovereignty place the Constitution above all – including the Party.
A genuinely liberal constitution must function as a social contract between the people and the state, setting boundaries on power and laying the foundation for a democratic system governed by the rule of law.
In Vietnam, however, this is not the case. Since 1945, the National Assembly has adopted five constitutions, but none have truly functioned as independent constitutional documents. Instead, each has essentially replicated the Party’s resolutions in response to changing political circumstances. Notably, Article 4 of the 2013 Constitution enshrines the Party’s leadership, yet provides no specific guidance on how the Party must operate within the bounds of constitutional and legal norms. Consequently, the Party is neither legally bound nor accountable under the Constitution.
Additional structural issues include the absence of an independent constitutional court and the lack of a genuinely autonomous legislature. The National Assembly is referred to as “the highest state power body,” yet remains under Party leadership. Most legal provisions follow or mirror Party resolutions, while the Party itself exists above and outside the law. As a result, the Constitution fails to embody Hegel’s ideal of the national spirit.
However, the problem is not merely the Constitution’s lack of practical enforcement. More fundamentally, one must question whether Hegel’s philosophy is suitable for application in Vietnam’s current political context. Two major arguments frame this debate:
First, Hegel represents a traditional, historically grounded mode of thinking, in which the national spirit is deeply connected to a particular national identity and moral order. For Hegel, patriotism is the unity of individuals with the national community through the state. He upholds the state as the highest expression of the national spirit – an idea that superficially aligns with the Party’s political model, particularly as enshrined in Article 4 of the 2013 Constitution. Building a national identity rooted in historical traditions, collective morality, and a unified ideal is central to Vietnam’s current political narrative. From a formal standpoint, Hegelian nationalism could be employed as a tool to legitimize the Party’s authority.
Second, however, Hegel formulated these ideas in the context of the 19th-century German state, using a logic grounded in liberal development. Therefore, one must differentiate between Rechtsstaat (rule-of-law state) and konstitutionelle Monarchie (constitutional monarchy) in Hegel’s work.
In Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Elements of the Philosophy of Right), Hegel describes the state as the realization of the universal will – a manifestation of freedom. The state is not merely an instrument of public order but a structure that institutionalizes freedom through law, ethical life (Sittlichkeit), and civil institutions.
At first glance, Hegel might appear to endorse the modern idea of a rule-of-law state. However, his concept of Rechtsstaat differs from contemporary understandings that emphasize checks and balances and constitutional limits on power. In his time, Hegel advocated a constitutional monarchy – not a parliamentary democracy. In his model, the monarch symbolizes national unity, ratifies laws, and remains above today governance. Power is divided among the monarch, the executive (government), and a parliament representing civil society. Yet, this division is not the strict tripartite separation championed by Montesquieu or modern liberal democracies.
In summary, this second argument underscores the limits of applying Hegel’s thought to Vietnam. The Party cannot selectively quote Hegel to justify its monopoly on power without distorting his philosophical intent.
If the Party insists on preserving its monopoly without pursuing the broader objective of freedom’s historical progression – or acknowledging the universality of freedom – it risks suppressing diversity and obstructing democratization. This would represent a form of narrow nationalism, antithetical to Hegel’s vision.
Most importantly, Vietnam is currently undergoing a transformation into a more diverse society, with increasing demands for transparency, rule of law, and international integration. In this context, Hegel’s philosophy may not offer suitable guidance for managing the relationship between citizen, state, and nation. Instead, in contemporary European political thought, patriotism grounded in democratic constitutionalism is the prevailing ideal—as emphasized by thinkers like Jürgen Habermas.
Jürgen Habermas‘ View on Constitutional Patriotism
The German philosopher Dolf Sternberger first introduced the concept of constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus). Drawing inspiration from Jean de la Bruyère’s quote, „There is no fatherland in tyranny,“ Sternberger argued that the nation does not deserve blind loyalty. The homeland can only legitimately ask for citizens’ allegiance if it guarantees their rights and freedoms; only a civil constitution can inspire genuine patriotism.
Jürgen Habermas further developed this concept in several philosophical works, most notably in Die postnationale Konstellation: Politische Essays (1998). Habermas famously argued that modern pluralistic societies require a new, non-exclusive form of patriotism – particularly relevant for postwar Germany and Europe – rooted not in ethnicity, culture, or nationalism, but in shared constitutional principles.
According to Habermas, postwar Germany could no longer rely on traditional national pride due to the legacy of Nazism. A new model of political identity needed to emerge, one that enabled unity in a democratic, multicultural society. In such a society, citizens from diverse backgrounds could still find common ground through a shared commitment to constitutional values.
In this light, patriotism must shift its content. It should no longer revere nationalism, race, or cultural identity, but be grounded in universal principles such as freedom, equality, the rule of law, human rights, and civil discourse. This form of patriotism is rational and based on consensus around democratic institutions.
Habermas redefines patriotism not through emotion or symbolism, but through civic consciousness, respect for the law, human rights, and social responsibility. This redefinition is both constructive and sustainable in an increasingly urbanized and globalized world.
The characteristics of constitutional patriotism include a focus on improving democratic institutions, building trust in the rule of law, encouraging critical engagement, and permitting constructive criticism of the state when constitutional values are threatened. Such a model, Habermas believes, can help rebuild national identity – not only in Germany, but across Europe.
Adaptability: Introducing Habermas’s Thought in Vietnam
Habermas’s philosophy, originating in Germany, has had a significant influence in Europe -especially in the UK and Spain – and has been studied in the United States and South Africa. Whether his ideas can be meaningfully applied in the context of modern Vietnam is an open question. However, the answer appears potentially positive, as Vietnam’s Constitution already enshrines many of the democratic principles central to Habermas’s theory.
Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution outlines universal democratic principles, including human and civil rights (Chapter II), freedom of speech, press, expression, and association. It affirms the rule of law (“The State governs society by law”) and states that power belongs to the people through the National Assembly and other institutions.
In form, then, Vietnam has a legal foundation for cultivating constitutional patriotism – one in which patriotism arises not merely from historical sentiment but from legal and political values enshrined in the Constitution. However, in substance, two major challenges persist.
The first challenge lies in the fact that the Constitution is not truly supreme, as the Communist Party retains monopolistic control over the state. Article 4 of the 2013 Constitution grants the Party comprehensive and absolute leadership, resulting in centralized power and a lack of independent checks and balances.
In contrast, Habermas’s concept requires power decentralization, institutional accountability, and open public discourse – elements currently lacking in Vietnam’s political system. Restrictions on freedom of expression, protest, and debate – particularly concerning Article 4 – reveal the difficulty of implementing such ideas under current conditions.
Habermas emphasizes dialogue, explanation, and criticism as essential to democratic life. Yet the Party explicitly calls for “strengthening the struggle against wrong and hostile views” in discussions related to constitutional reform. This suggests a closed political culture where genuine civic discourse is suppressed. The key question becomes: what can be done to break this vicious cycle?
The second challenge concerns the political consciousness of the public. Vietnam’s civic education system focuses primarily on emotional patriotism rooted in historical memory, rather than on cultivating legal awareness, civic responsibility, or critical thinking.
This situation stems from limited political education, lack of access to diverse information, widespread apathy, declining public trust, and the economic pressures of daily life. As a result, the concept of constitutional patriotism remains unfamiliar to many Vietnamese citizens and difficult to implement.
In the short term, introducing Habermas’s concept seems impractical. In the long term, however, it holds promise. But to realize this potential, the current deadlock- between the people’s expectations and the Party’s political will – must be resolved. This is the crux of the issue: two separate entities within one nation, each with different visions, must find common ground. Two fundamental factors are the Party’s will and the People’s aspiration
The first factor is the Party’s political will. While the Party understandably wishes to maintain its position of power, it must ask whether it has the sincerity and goodwill to undertake reforms that could lead to a democratic, law-based society as envisioned by Habermas. Decentralization, independent oversight, and renewed civic education focusing on legal awareness and democratic values must be prioritized. Revolutionary rhetoric is no longer sufficient; today, the Party must rely on legal reasoning and public persuasion, through cooperation and dialogue.
The second factor is the will of the people. What do they expect? What do they understand about national self-determination? Vietnam currently lacks the civic infrastructure to foster such understanding. The Party is no longer seen as the working class’s loyal servant, and its achievements cannot substitute for a legitimate legal mandate. Public consensus must be expressed through a referendum-based framework.
The Party’s legitimacy, therefore, must ultimately rest on a referendum carried out within a rule-of-law framework.
Conclusion
Vietnam is undergoing profound change. Both the Party and the people must acknowledge a critical need: Vietnam does not yet possess a fully people-driven Constitution. There is a need for a new foundational document – a true original contract (contractus originarius) in the spirit of constitutional theory.
As Rousseau rightly asserted, such a founding act requires at least one unanimous law: the social contract. If executed properly, this new contract would allow the government and people to address coexistence within a constitutional framework.
At present, applying Habermas’s ideas faces many obstacles, but in the long term, they offer an important vision. With constitutional patriotism, as understood by Habermas, Vietnam can reaffirm national spirit based on the rule of law and substantive democracy. By reforming civic education to foster democratic values, legal awareness, and critical thought, a meaningful path forward can be established.
Whether or not Vietnam adopts Habermas’s philosophy, its future patriotism will depend on two crucial forces: the people’s rising expectations and the Party’s readiness for reform. If these two forces can converge, it will depend on whether the Party sincerely commits to political reform within a legal framework, and whether the people are prepared and empowered to express constitutional patriotism.
These possibilities stretch beyond the scope of this article – but they point toward a long-term national vision worthy of deeper exploration.
KIM THEM DO 